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By Lance L. Arberry 
Comparatively, the lawmaking process in presidential systems is often comprised 
of negotiations between a legislative body, tasked with authoring and legislating laws, 
and an executive, who must authorize and administer the enactment of the law. While 
executives are often empowered with certain constitutional powers to help influence the 
lawmaking process, these powers are typically constrained and supervisory in nature. 
Presidents are rarely given broad-and-discretionary legislative powers, since lawmaking 
is ultimately the responsibility of the legislative body; however, this does not hold true 
for the case of Brazil.  
Following the adoption of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, Presidents were empowered 
with the power of Media Provisória, or provisional decree. Conceived as emergency 
power to address national crises, provisional decrees provides Brazilian presidents with 
the ability to issue orders, rules, and laws that possess the immediate full effect and force 
of the law upon issuance, completely independent of the legislative process and the 
Brazilian National Congress. While these decrees carry the full effect of the law, they 
ultimately require Congressional approval within 45 days of passage. As an emergency 
power, provisional decrees ought to be used sparingly; however ideal, this has not been in 
the case in Brazil, where presidents have used provisional decrees extensively.   
Rather than work with Congress, Brazilian presidents have historically issued 
decrees to legislate their policies. In attempt to limit the provisional decrees and regain 
legislative control, Brazilian legislators adopted Constitutional Amendment 32, which 
drastically curtailed and reformed the usage of decrees. This has led Brazilian legislators, 
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political scientists, and constitutional scholars to believe that the use of provisional 
decrees has impacted the regular lawmaking process in Brazil, granting Brazilian 
executives extraordinary power and influence over the legislature.  
This paper sought to understand how the executive-legislative relationship in 
Brazil has changed as a result of provisional decrees and Amendment 32. This paper 
examined the issuance of provisional decrees, their reissuance, the number of decrees 
converted into law, and the number of laws passed under the traditional legislative 
process. The research and analysis in this paper indicates that while decrees have become 
a dominant tool of Brazilian executives, Amendment 32 has not completely reversed 
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On the Presidential System 
Throughout the history of the United States, no other institution has represented the 
power, the unity, and the influence of the nation more strongly than the President. 
Departing from the traditional systems of monarchy and parliament, the Founders of the 
United States created a new system of government that diffused power among three 
different branches, each containing a unique system to check and balance the power of 
each respective branch. Unbeknownst at the time, the Founders institution a unique 
forever shape domestic politics, international relations, and constitutional theory in 
unexpected ways, through the expansion of the United States’ power and through the 
emulation of their creation.  
As the head of state, the head of government, and Commander-In-Chief of the United 
States Armed Forces, the president has changed broad powers; through the President’s 
constitutional role originally concerned matters of foreign affairs (Powell 1472), the 
scope and responsibilities of the President has expanded to cover almost every aspect of 
domestic policy during the 19th and 20th centuries (Marshall 506). As the President’s 
power evolved over time, so too did that of the United States; as the country began to rise 
as a global influence and power, many observers attributed the country’s economic, 
political, and military success and dominance, in part, to its use of the presidential 
system. With this belief in mind, societies from across the world began to model and 
organize their governments after the U.S. system. There are 64 countries in the world that 
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have adopted the presidential system (Mandelbaum 7), which suggests the popularity of 
the U.S. model.  
In order to address their own unique needs and to ensure the continuity and success of 
their governments, many countries have altered their systems to provide differing powers, 
including a wider-array of powers to the president. One of these numerous powers is the 
ability of executive degree, the process through which a president is empowered to enact 
legislation and policy without the prior consent of the independent legislature. Rather 
than submit their policies for consideration by legislatures, executives can effectively 
issue decrees to achieve their preferred outcomes. Although it could be argued that this 
popular adoption represents the strength and reliance of American democracy, the 
expansion of executive decree powers in presidential systems has been called into 
question by some keen observers, as countries have adopted this facet of intuitional 
design to varying success. 
Approval vs. Leadership: Two Types of Legislative Powers Afforded to Presidents 
A distinguishing characteristic between presidential and parliamentary systems is the 
diffusion of executive and legislative powers. In a parliamentary system, the executive 
leadership of the government remains within the power of the legislative body; 
conversely in a presidential system, the president maintains executive powers and is 
elected independently from the legislature, and often possesses limited legislative powers 
(Linz, Mainwaring 4). Within the study of presidentialism, the literature has devoted 
considerable attention to the executive-legislative relations of presidential systems; and 
more specifically, the trend towards empowering presidents with the ability to influence 
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legislation and the legislative processes. These legislative powers have traditionally 
defined into two distinctive categories: reactive and proactive (Carey and Shugart 5).  
As a preventative measure to halt an action of the legislature, reactive powers allow a 
president to prevent the adoption of legislation or policy, despite any institutional 
preferences or inclinations to support it; and they are considered to be more 
“conservative” powers, due to their ability to halt any alteration of the status quo (Carey 
and Shugart 6). The most common and widely known reactive presidential power is the 
veto. In the United States, the President is able to use the veto, or threat of use, to block 
pieces of legislation that does not reflect the position of their administrations or of their 
law-making priorities. Absent an override from both chambers of Congress, the veto 
represents a power tool at the disposable of executives. While reactive powers are far 
more common amongst presidential systems; many presidential democracies provide 
their executives with abilities that enable them to more actively shape the legislative 
process.  
Proactive powers cover a wide array of tools and mechanisms that empower 
presidents to better control the outcomes of the legislature; and these abilities are often 
realized through two types of power: agenda-setting and decree authority. The agenda-
setting power is the ability for an executive to control which areas of policy a legislature 
is able to debate and the manner through which the legislature considers a policy (Carey 
and Shugart 6; Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, 
Presidential Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian 
Congres 3). This power is realized through the American president’s ability to convene a 
special session of Congress to consider a certain policy, or where the executive possesses 
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the exclusive responsibility to introduce policy, as in the cases of budget policy in 
Argentina, Chile, and Taiwan (Haggard, McCubbins and Shugart 322). Although agenda-
setting powers represent a dynamic tool at the disposal of executives, the power of 
executive decree represents a far more dynamic and complex mechanism in the formation 
of public policy.  
Whereas agenda-setting power allows a president to influence and direct a legislature 
to consider certain policy, the decree power empowers an executive to directly create and 
enact laws without the prior approval of the legislature (Carey and Shugart 9). While the 
complete definition and strength of decree powers varies across systems, executive 
decrees, to varying extent, are subject to the consent of the legislature. In Russia and the 
Ukraine, presidents are able issue decrees covering economic, political, and societal 
policy areas; in effect, the only restriction is that the decree cannot be in violation of their 
respective constitutions and national laws (Protsyk 645; Carey and Shugart 10). In 
Colombia, the president is able to issue effective executive orders during times of 
economic crises, where they have emergency powers to restore economic stability (Carey 
and Shugart 10). Often, the nature of presidential decrees can be vague, such as case with 
Peru. Here, the president is empowered to issue decrees when they are germane to the 
country’s national financial and economic interests (Carey and Shugart 10). Historically, 
executives have used their decree authority to initiate military actions, to enact budgetary 
or organizational reforms, and even to create new governmental departments and 
programs. While decrees have a broad range, an important aspect to consider in 
observing decree powers is the immediacy and longevity of the policies.      
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Carey and Shugart describe decree powers in terms of their immediacy: emergency 
powers and traditional constitutional degree authority. In the times of national 
emergencies, executives are often vested with broad and extreme discretionary powers, 
such as declaring martial law and to curtail civil and political liberties. However, 
executives are only authorized to use these emergency powers for the limited duration of 
the crisis (Carey and Shugart 15). While these powers are defined in terms of emergency 
response, numerous governments and academic researchers have witnessed leaders 
exploit, abuse, and routinize emergency powers to their own prerogatives regularly. In 
order to curtail and prevent the abuse of these powers, some systems utilize traditional 
constitutional degree authority powers that provide the legislative or judiciary bodies 
with mechanisms to check the decree powers of an executive.   
Although executive decrees are immediately effective upon issuance in the cases of 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Italy, they are ultimately subject to legislative oversight 
and approval (Carey and Shugart 11). Known as provisional decrees, the legislative body, 
within a certain time frame, must ratify these decrees; or they become null-and-void. 
Objectively from a separation of powers perspective, provisional decrees represent a 
compromise between the desire to provide an executive with the ability to actively shape 
and administer government policy and the desire for a legislature to maintain oversight 
over the executive. However ideal, the practical application of executive decrees have 
been subject to criticism, as executive decrees have been used to effectively circumvent 
the legislative process; thus, representing a shift towards executive dominance in both 
presidential and parliamentary systems.  
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In Russia, for example, the number of bills passed through the constitutionally 
defined legislative process has greatly outnumbered by decrees. Following the failed 
coup d'état against President Mikhail Gorbachev and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
newly elected President Boris Yeltsin urged the drafters of the new Russian constitution 
and citizens to empower the president with an overriding decree power to better address 
the immediate circumstances and the needs of the Russian people (Parrish 78). Gaining 
an almost absolute executive-decree power, the Russian President can issue decrees that 
are effectively immediately, and are not subject to legislative oversight, granted that they 
do not violate the constitution (Parrish 78). A powerful tool, this decree power 
dynamically transformed the legislative process in Russia. During his first term, President 
Yeltsin endorsed 5,072 decrees that became law while the legislature passed a meager 
425 federal laws during the same period (Parrish 82). These decrees covered a wide-
range of subjects, such as executive appointments and military promotions to the 
privatization of state-owned assets and budget policy, the latter of which is traditionally a 
responsibility and prerogative of the legislature (Parrish 90).  
Historically in Italy, a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister had been 
constitutionally empowered with provisional decree powers; however, leaders found little 
recourse to exercise the ability. In their study, Sala and Kreppel examined the total 
number of legislation adopted via the legislative process and compared it to that of the 
number of decrees issued by the Prime Minister and the decrees ratified by Parliament, 
from 1948 to 1992. From the founding of the country in 1948 to 1976, Prime Ministers 
worked with Parliament to affect public policy, relying upon the decree very 
sporadically; however Sala and Kreppel found this trend to reverse drastically after 1976, 
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when the number of decrees issued began to exceed the number of ordinary bills (Della 
Sala and Kreppel 189).  In the first session of Parliament between 1948-53, the body 
approved 2,015 bills and 29 decrees; by the eighth session of 1979-1983, the Parliament 
approved 769 bills and 275 decrees. By 1992, this trend was further solidified as 
Parliament approved 292 bills while the Prime Minister issued a total of 409 decrees 
(Della Sala and Kreppel 190).  
The scope and reliance on executive decrees in the Russian presidential system and 
the Italian Parliamentary system demonstrate that decrees can dynamically affect the 
legislative process of a country, whether it is a presidential or a parliamentary system. 
Within the scholarship of executive decrees, one country that presents an interesting case 
to study the historical use of decrees by presidents and the attempts by the legislature to 
constrain executive dominance in the legislative process is Brazil.  
Media Provisória: Provisional Executive Decrees in Brazil 
Brazil, one of the world’s largest and most populated countries, has a government that 
is unique in that it is a presidential system, modeled highly off of the United States, 
which has empowered its president with a powerful and dynamic provisional decree 
power (Carey and Shugart 24). A republic since 1886, Brazil adopted a new presidential-
based constitution in 1988 that provided the President and the National Congress with 
wide-range of new abilities, including Article 62; which establishes provisional measures 
(Vajda, de Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares de Souza 32).  
Excluding matters of criminal prosecution, the Brazilian Constitution empowers the 
President to issue decrees that immediately possess the force of law; however the 
decree’s effectiveness is only temporary, as decrees must receive the endorsement of 
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Congress within 60 days (32). While Article 62 specifically mentions that provisional 
decrees are to be used in “important and urgent cases”, presidents have often relied upon 
this emergency power as an indispensable tool to shape the legislative process. Pereira, 
Power, and Rennó found that over the first 13 years under the new constitutions, 
Presidents issued a decree every single week, and that this represented more than 75% of 
all the laws passed during those years (71, 75). While these decrees ultimately require 
Congressional approval, Brazilian Presidents were able to indefinitely reissue these 
decrees, regardless of any attempts of Congressional oversight (76) (Parrish 40). Brazil’s 
constitution empowered the executive and legislative branches to both influence and 
control the legislative process; however through the use of provisional decrees, it has 
allowed the executive branch to exert tremendous influence over the legislative agenda 
(Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential 
Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congres; Carey 
and Shugart; Della Sala and Kreppel). 
Realizing that Article 62 weakened Congress’s oversight and lawmaking 
prerogatives, the Brazilian legislators adopted Constitutional Amendment 32 in an 
attempt to exert its power over the executive branch by constraining the President’s 
ability to issue decrees. (Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda 
Power, Presidential Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the 
Brazilian Congres 71). Following the adoption of Amendment 32, Presidents were no 
longer able to issue decrees indefinitely; rather, decrees can only be reissued once, and 
only if Congress did not consider the decree within the 60-day timeframe (Vajda, de 
Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares de Souza 156). Additionally, Amendment 32 
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provides the Congress with a more direct mechanism for decree oversight. If either 
chamber of Brazil does not consider the measure’s Congress within 45 days, then that 
decree is advanced to the top of legislative agenda and supersedes all other matters 
(Vajda, de Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares de Souza 156). Despite their 
intentions to regain power, Pereira, Power, and Rennó found that the application of 
Amendment 32 actually further strengthened the executive’s power. Since Congress must 
consider each-and-every decree once it has passed the 45-day mark, the legislative 
agenda became increasing slowed and gridlocked. Known as “trancamento da pauta”, or 
the lockdown of the agenda, it represents another hurdle of the legislative branch 
(Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential 
Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congres 71).  
Purpose of Study and Summary: 
Featuring an exceedingly fragmented multi-party system, a unique federal system 
representing a diverse population, and a vibrant presidential system, Brazil offers a 
unique opportunity to study executive-legislative relations by examining the factors that 
influence the relationship (Mainwaring, Multipartism, Robust Federalism and 
Presidentialism in Brazil 89); however, the literature has not discussed the impact of 
media provisória or constitutional Amendment 32 as extensively.  
This study seeks to understand how the dynamics in the relationship between Brazil’s 
executive and legislative leadership evolved through the implementation of the 1988 
Constitution, the use of provisional decrees, and the attempt to reform the power through 
Amendment 32 of the Brazilian Constitution. Beginning with a historical overview of 
Brazil and its presidential system, I study the country’s executive-legislative relationship 
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by analyzing the use of provisional decrees during the administrations of Presidents 
Cardoso and Lula and the amount of legislative oversight the Brazilian National Congress 
had over these decrees. In order to measure the use of provisional decrees and 
Congressional oversight, this study utilized descriptive process tracing to account for 
each institution’s activities.  Using data gathered from the Brazilian National Archives 
from 1996 to 2007, I track the issuance of provisional decrees issued, reissued, converted 
into law, and those rejected by the Congress and compare that data to the number of 
ordinary legislation passed through the traditional legislative process in the legislature. 
To analyze the dynamics in the system’s executive-legislative relationship, I describe 
executive legislative success as the number provisional decrees issued, reissued, and 
converted into law; conversely, I measure legislative oversight by examining the number 
of provisional decrees, impaired, nullified, and otherwise rejected by the Congress.  
Using these data, I concluded overall that while Amendment 32 reformed and 
constrained Presidents Cardoso and Lula’s ability to exercise their provisional decree 
ability, the Amendment did not allow for the Brazilian National Congress to completely 
regain its oversight and lawmaking responsibilities. Additionally, I compare my findings 
to the established literature on provisional decrees in Brazil; and found that my data 
supports both prevailing theories that describe the motivations behind executives issuing 
provisional decrees and the legislature’s overwhelming approval of these measures. I 
conclude by discussing some relevant implications of provisional decree usage on public 
policy, articulating some weakness and limitations of my study, and finally by suggesting 
some future areas for study.  
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In order to comprehend and understand the environment in which provisional decree 
usage arose in Brazil, I will first review the relevant literature on the systematic 
foundations and key differences between the presidential and parliamentary systems. 
Next, I will briefly provide a general overview of the Brazilian federal government, and 
then discuss the numerous factors that contribute to the legislative environment in Brazil. 
Lastly, I discuss the two predominate interpretations of how and why provisional decrees 





 In order to better understand provisional decree usage in Brazil, I will first review 
three areas of literature that provides insight to form a working foundation of knowledge 
for this study. First, I review the literature on the presidential and parliamentary systems. 
While the former system is more popular, some scholars believe that the latter is much 
better suited for the majority of presidential countries. I articulate the major differences 
between the two, and then describe how presidential systems have the capability and 
increased risk to become burdened with legislative gridlock. This discussion is relevant 
as Brazil adopted provisional decrees in an effort to avoid and counter legislative 
gridlock due to the unique intricacies of their presidential system.  
 Next, I provide an overview of the Brazilian system. I begin with an overview of 
the constitutional underpinnings of the system. An open-list multiparty proportional 
representation system, Brazil is often characterized as having a weak centralized party 
system. I discuss the Brazilian party system in more detail, and then review the literature 
on the legislative process in Brazil. This system’s legislature is unique in that it is highly 
transient, its legislators and parties lack discipline, and that there is very little institutional 
knowledge and experience maintained through each successive congress. Furthermore, I 
assess a peculiarity in the legislative electoral process; by which politicians decisively 
attempt to seek out local officials and gubernatorial candidates, instead of presidential 
candidates, for support. Taken together, these factors contribute to the unique system 
through which provisional decree usage has flourished. As a result of this system’s 
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foundations, the academic community has sought to understand why presidents rely upon 
provisional decrees and how their usage impacts the legislative process and relationship 
in Brazil. 
 Among the study of provisional decrees in Brazil, the established work has been 
articulated into two disparate conclusions. I analyze these conclusions to provide a 
foundation of what has been established, and I will later use my data and compare my 
findings to these established theories.  
The Question of Régime Type: Presidential v. Parliamentary Models 
Within the study of political science, the academic community has devoted 
considerable effort to discuss, debate, and analyze the intrinsic differences between the 
two methods of government organization. The scholarship seeks to examine the 
distinguishing characteristics of the two systems, their relative advantages and 
disadvantages, and how both systems are able to withstand and adapt to the various 
events and issues that impact governance. Inherent to any functioning régime is the 
principle of survival and stability. A country’s decision to adopt a certain method can 
influence the survival and stability of the government; historically, “between the years of 
1946-1999, one in every twenty-tree presidential régimes died, whereas only one in every 
fifty-eight parliamentary regimes died” (Cheibub and Limongi 1). While there are 
numerous factors those impact régime survival and performance, the two models are able 
to adapt to these factors in different ways and with varying success; and thus, the choice 




Powerful, Popular, and Perplex: Defining the Presidential System 
A defining characteristic of the presidential system is the division of executive 
and legislative powers; within this system, the legislative branch exists separately and 
independently from the executive branch of the president. While the President of the 
United States, and its relationship between the legislative and judicial powers, serves as 
the exemplar of this model, presidential scholars have noted three primary characteristics 
of this system: first, the president is constitutionally bound with a limited mandate to lead 
(Linz; Lijphart); second, the president is elected upon a popular, “winner-takes-all”, basis 
that is independently from the legislature (Linz; Mainwaring); and third, the president is 
exclusively responsible for administrating the laws and regulations of the government 
and is responsible for the regular operation of the national government (Shugart and 
Carey; Mainwaring).  
While the literature generally recognizes these three distinctions, Shugart and 
Carey distinguish a fourth feature of the presidential system that is important to mention: 
fourthly, a president is empowered with some form of power, some measure that enables 
the executive to influence the formation of legislative language, policy, and law (21). As 
the head of government, the president is often tasked with the enforcement of the law; 
typically, presidents are not granted sweeping legislative powers. Despite this, Shugart 
and Carey note that often, a president is granted the power of the veto to shape legislative 
policy.  
Constitutionally, a president and his or her administration are elected to govern on 
a limited and temporal mandate; additionally, a president is subject to re-election upon 
the competition of the term, and is often further confined by term limits. In contrast to 
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parliamentary systems, where a ruling government is dependent upon the constant 
support of the electorate, a president, while elected popularly, is not reliant upon popular 
support; and this characteristic provides certain advantages and disadvantages. Whereas a 
parliament would have to seriously consider the immediate implications of policy 
decisions and outcomes, a president would be able to introduce more difficult and 
comprehensive policies without being subjected to the often shifting beliefs and the 
opinions of the electorate. In terms of régime stability, this characteristic has often been 
described as a unique advantage of the presidential model; however, these mandates have 
also been the source of corruption, manipulation, and failure of numerous presidential 
governments. 
Throughout recent political history, the American form of government and the 
successes of the American presidency have served as models of emulation for many 
democracies; however, the subsequent adoptions have not always yielded the same 
results in promise. Indeed, within states that adopted a presidential system, the literature 
has noted several characteristics and negative consequences of adopting and managing a 
presidential system poorly. Among the many aspects of the presidential model, the 
literature has focused on the undesirable outcomes of: governmental gridlock, resulting 
from irreconcilable differences in opinion and policy decisions between the executive and 
legislative powers (Mainwaring; Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism; Cheibub and 
Limongi); because of the winner-take-all electoral system and potential for gridlock, 
presidential systems often have a higher-risk of deteriorating into authoritarian régimes 
(Cheibub and Limongi; Linz); the scholarship has also described how a presidential 
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system possess the capability to intensify to ethnic tensions within a state, ultimately 
resulting in ethnic conflicts (Linz).  
 As witnessed through the recent difficulties between the Obama administration 
and the divided Congress, presidential systems are susceptible conflicting political 
opinions and are also susceptible to governmental gridlock. While the American system 
has been able to sufficiently overcome this obstacle, other governments have not been as 
successful. If governments are unable to overcome gridlock and irreconcilable 
difficulties, these systems are more prone to state failures; Cheibub and Limongi found 
that during presidential systems of the third-wave of democratization, one out of every 26 
presidential system perished as a result of gridlock while only one out of every 31 
parliamentary systems failed as a result of gridlock. The literature has attempted to 
articulate the reasoning for the disparate results during the same time period; and one 
prominent answer points towards the ability of parliaments to order new elections, and 
this mechanism allows these systems to better adapt to gridlock (Tsebelis).  
The Parliamentary System 
Where the sharp division between executive and legislative powers marks 
presidential systems, parliamentary systems possess no such difference; rather, the 
authority and responsibility for the administration of the government lies solely within its 
legislative body (Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism; Lijphart). The most prominent 
example of this system is the power held by the two houses of the British Parliament. 
Known as the Westminster model, the British Parliament is a bicameral legislature 
composed of the Houses of Lords and Commons; and this form of government has been 
adopted by numerous democracies. Within this system, constituents elect representatives 
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to national legislatures; who in turn, select executive leadership from the legislature’s 
membership. Where presidents govern on a specific and often time-limited mandate, 
parliamentary leadership is subject to the shifting and moving confidences of elected 
representatives and the electorate itself.  
Founded upon the idea of legislative confidence, these systems are defined by a 
fundamental requirement of a “majoritarian imperative”, where a ruling regime existence 
is tied to the support of the legislative body; and if a majority is not achieved, new 
elections must be scheduled to support a functioning government (Cheibub and Limongi 
4). For parliamentary systems, the center of government is created or dissipated by 
support.  Within the deliberative bodies, legislators elect a representative, often called the 
prime minister, whom establishes a cabinet to represent and administer the government. 
Throughout the adoption of this form, much of the academic literature has found that 
these systems, subjected to the will of the people’s representatives, offer substantial 
advantages, such as: state stability, as parliamentary systems can utilize inherent 
mechanisms to replace a weak or inefficient administration; government efficiency, as 
governments are often formed based upon a legislative coalition that seeks to advance a 
specific régime; and the potential for more accurate representation, as parties and 
individual representatives are able to reflect the diverse constituencies of the populations 
(Cheibub and Limongi; Shugart and Carey).  
Realizing that state stability and gridlock are essential to a functioning 
government, decrees can serve as a bridge between the two systems. In an effort to 
maximize the government’s ability to act given harsh division in a legislature, decrees 
allow presidents to temporarily circumvent the legislative process. A strong presidential 
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system, Brazil represents one such bridge, as their presidents are able to issue provisional 
decrees. With provisional decrees, presidents are able to control the legislative agenda 
and rationalize decisions, very similar to how a prime minister would. Before an analysis 
of how provisional decrees can proceed, an understanding of the cultural and political 
history of Brazil is necessary. 
República Federativa do Brasil: 
Historical Overview of the Federal Republic of Brazil 
Gaining its independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil is a culturally diverse 
country that has a rich political, social, and economic history. Politically, Brazil is a 
federal presidential republic, encompassing 27 subnational states, which features a strong 
multi-party system and proportional representation. Central power is diffused into three 
different branches: the executive, led by the President and its cabinet; the legislature, 
embodied by the National Congress of Brazil; and the judicial, represented by the 
Supreme Federal Court and Superior Court of Justice.  
A strong presidential system, Brazilian presidents are empowered with a wide-
range of constitutional abilities at their disposal. Excluding provisional decrees, the 
President possess a strong veto power, including standard, pocket, and a partial line-item 
veto. These vetoes, however, are often subject to override, as both chambers of the 
Brazilian Congress only require a simple majority to nullify the President’s veto.  
Additionally, the President is empowered with the exclusive right to initiate and 
introduce legislation, covering a range of policy areas including: defense and matters of 
national security, creation of federal departments and control over salaries, direction and 
funding of the criminal-justice system (Vajda, de Queiroz Carvalho Zimbres and Tavares 
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de Souza 40). In his study of presidential systems, Mainwaring found that there are only 
six presidential systems that provide executives with this power; and in Brazil, this 
represented a sweeping power that grants the President an inordinate amount of power 
over Congress (61). Objectively, the President and Congress each have unique 
constitutional powers that enable them to jointly work together to bring about policy; 
historically, however, the President has had more success at influencing the legislative 
process due to the tendency for the National Congress to be institutionally gridlocked.  
A bicameral legislature, the National Congress of Brazil is composed of the 
Federal Senate, the upper chamber, and the Chamber of Deputies, the body’s lower 
house. Similar to the United States, each of the 27 sub-national states is provided equal 
representation with three Senators, elected on a plurality system. Another unique facet of 
Brazil, the Chamber of Deputies differs by utilizing a proportional-representation system 
to allocate seats to each sub-national state, based on population. While the multiparty 
system in Brazil allows for the inclusion of different political parties and more diverse 
representation, it also allows for certain unusual political occurrences and unfavorable 
outcomes. 
Multiparty System in Brazil 
Characterized by “notorious party underdevelopment, the most distinctive feature 
of Brazilian political parties are their fragility, their ephemeral character, their weak roots 
in society, and the autonomy politicians of the catch-all parties enjoy with respect to their 
parties” (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 354), a major source of 
influence over executive-legislative relationship in Brazil is its unique party system. 
Where most presidential systems contain smaller parties, Brazil’s multiparty system is 
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often a cause of gridlock and debate; because of this factor, Brazil is cited as a state 
where the state is far more dominant influence than individual parties (Mainwaring, 
Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 387; Samuels and Zucco, The Power of 
Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments 4) Throughout the country’s 
history, Mainwaring notes that there have been seven distinct party systems; essentially, 
the country has observed one-party, two-parties, and multiparty system since its 
foundation (361). While it is important to underscore the systems and transitions the 
country has undergone, the current multiparty system, founded shortly after the adoption 
of the 1988 Constitution, is the only system germane to this study.      
Under the current system, Mainwaring defines three archetypes of political 
parties, each with their own advantages and disadvantages: “disciplined and 
programmatic parties, moderately disciplined parties, and loosely organized parties that 
have comparatively weak programmatic commitments” (376). Among these three 
archetypes, there are over 27 registered political parties; however, the most prominent 
parties are Partido dos Trabalhadores (the Worker’s Party, or PT); Partido da Social 
Democracia Brasileira (the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, or PSDB); and, Partido 
do Movimento Democrático Brasilerio (the party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, 
or PMDB) (Samuels and Zucco, The Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from 
Survey Experiments 2). While the PT and PSDB have been the only successful parties in 
obtaining the presidency, Brazil’s party system is far more complex due its numerous 
parties and electoral volatility (Samuels, The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism 
and Congressional Elections in Brazil 5). Weak and numerous, the strongest hurdle for 
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political parties is ensuring party cohesion, unity, loyalty, and strength; however, this is 
difficult due to how Brazilian politicians see and associate with political parties.   
Unstable and fluid, the composition of Brazilian political parties is constantly 
subjected to the changing beliefs and membership of politicians. In Brazil where political 
parties are often weak and disorganized, campaigns for political offices are highly 
individualistic; here, politicians often rely on their own individual talents, staff, and 
fundraising abilities to win elections. For Brazilian politicians, they do not see political 
parties as practical entities that provide them with resources or opportunities; rather 
politicians view parties as “a partido de alugue,” or rentals (Samuels and Zucco, The 
Power of Partisanship in Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments 159). In terms of 
party membership and composition, this forces many politicians to conduct an impact 
calculus on their identification; from a rational self-interest perspective, Brazilian 
politicians use parties as a vehicle to advance their agendas (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak 
Parties, Feckless Democracy 376; Samuels and Zucco, The Power of Partisanship in 
Brazil: Evidence from Survey Experiments 157). Parties are known as “rentals” because 
when the party no longer suits or advances a politician’s interest, he or she will switch to 
one that provides better opportunities. From the perspective of legislative stability and 
efficiency, this can cause chaos on the legislative process, and has happened numerous 
times throughout the history of the country.  In 1987, 72 Congressmen loyal to the Béte 
Noire (Arena or the PDS) party became members of the PMBD overnight (Mainwaring, 
Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 378). In 1978, a body of 78 MBD elected 
mayors jointly changed party identification to PDS (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties, 
Feckless Democracy 378). Additionally from 1991-1998, Desposato found that 474 
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Congressmen and over 17 Senators switched parties during the time period (7).  In these 
instances, the large number of politicians changed parties because it served their self-
rational interests; and while this attributes to some political conversions, another 
prominent reason is because of the Brazil’s catchall parties.  
Historically, ideology has influenced party unity and cohesion of Brazilian 
political parties; more specifically, Mainwaring and Perez Lifian found that ideologically 
left parties have historically been able to better control and discipline their members. By 
analyzing roll-call votes of Brazilian Congressmen and comparing those against party 
directives, they found that members of the PT were strongly cohesive and unified; PT 
legislators voted against the party 2% of the time and scored a 98.0 on their party 
discipline scale (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, Party Discipline in the Brazilian National 
Congress 14). Here, the PT’s party cohesion, discipline, and loyalty is not representative 
of the all political parties; and Mainwaring and Perez Lifian found that party switching, 
while influenced by ideology, is ultimately influenced by the party to provide power and 
benefits to the individual legislator (18). Additionally, catchall political parties have also 
contributed to the phenomena. As a result of Brazil’s multiparty, proportional 
representation system, some political parties seek to rationalize power through numbers 
rather than belief; catchall parties mobilize along multiple ideologies to acquire support 
(Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 380). Gathering behind 
numbers rather than belief, it is not surprising that catchall parties are highly 
undisciplined; most notably, the PMBD, a catchall party, has historically scored lowed in 
terms of discipline, 65 out of 100, and has seen numerous party defections (Mainwaring 
and Linan, Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress 467). As a whole, 
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the nature of the various parties have led to legislative issues, such as members of 
political parties defecting to other parties, the inability to ensure that each representative 
votes along party lines, and the style of representation that prevent the President’s party 
from electing a congressional majority. Given the highly individualistic nature of political 
campaigns, observers have noted that rather railing behind a national political party and 
presidential campaigns, many politicians have turned to governors for electoral support. 
Known as the “gubernatorial coattails effect,” Samuels found that due rather than 
national parties and national figures, candidates for state governorships possess far more 
influence and clout in congressional elections (Samuels, The Gubernatorial Coattails 
Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil 241). He cites the relative 
weakness of national political parties at the state and local levels as reasons why 
congressional candidates often shape their political campaigns around the platform of a 
gubernatorial candidate (Samuels 241-242). Samuels cites four distinct factors as to why 
candidates are more likely to align themselves with gubernatorial candidates: (1) the 
fragmented and pathetic state of national parties, (2) the relative strength of the diverse 
state governments, (3) the prevalence of electoral rules, and (4) the sheer fact that state 
elections are often held at the same time of congressional elections (Samuels 241-245). 
Shugart’s research on Brazilian political parties lends support the Samuel’s position; 
except for a select few parties, national political parties in Brazil are relatively weak at 
the subnational level (Mainwaring, Brazil: Weak Parties, Feckless Democracy 380).  Due 
to the fact that the relative strength and organization of national political parties are weak 
the state level, Samuels states that on average there are up to four candidates, from 
different parties, in each gubernatorial race and these candidates attempt to assimilate 
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other candidates, from the various municipal, state, and local campaigns, into their 
stronger gubernatorial campaign in order consolidate power, consolidate resources and to 
gain political momentum (243). The combined effort of the multiple campaigns provides 
better odds of winning the election on the coattails of the gubernatorial candidate. The 
second and fourth factor, that is the strength of states and the timing of the elections, 
support Samuels’ theory. Due to their proximity to local issues and the electorate, 
candidates for Congress are more likely to align with a potential governor for access to 
resources and perks, than the distant federal executive (Samuels 243).  
Together, this discussion of the theoretical foundations of presidential power, the 
overview of Brazil’s federal government, and the unique multiparty system contributes to 
the utilization of provisional decrees by Brazilian presidents. Afflicted by weak political 
party cohesion and discipline, burdened by ever-changing party composition, and 
weakened by the gubernatorial coattails effect, there are numerous factors that shape the 
relationship Brazilian presidents have with the Congress. While there has been 
considerable research analyzing the impact of political parties and their impact, there has 
been little research to describe the impression provisional decrees have had on Brazil’s 
separation of powers.  
Literature on Provisional Decrees and its Impact on Brazil’s Separation of Powers 
Of what work has been done, there is a debate concerning the extent of the 
legislature’s lawmaking power is diminished as a result of provisional decrees. Abstractly 
an argument concerning the strength and tenacity of Brazil’s separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of government, most of the literature on 
provisional decrees in Brazil has defined decrees as representing an erosion of legislative 
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power at the bequest and advantage of the president. With each decree issued and passed, 
these observers view it as the executive gaining more power. Where most have seen 
provisional decrees as an erosion of legislative power, others have found that provisional 
decrees serve the interest of individual legislators and the legislature, as a whole. This 
belief is founded upon the idiosyncratic characteristics of Brazil’s system, and that this is 
the only manner through which meaningful and substantial policy can come into 
existence.  
Supporting the argument that decrees represent an erosion of legislative power 
and the strengthening of the executive, Pereira, Power, and Renno’s most strongly 
support the notion that the executive-legislative relationship has shifted. Analyzing the 
monthly issuance of provisional decrees from 1995-2005, Perira et al. concluded that 
provisional decrees and the intentional results of Amendment 32 have provided the power 
with extraordinary power to control the legislative agenda (Pereira, Power and Rennó, 
From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential Decrees, and the Unintended 
Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congress 74). Their research was composed of 
multivariate regression and descriptive statistics analyzing the provisional decrees, the 
levels of presidential popularity and legislative support, and other variables. While they 
found that provisional decrees were used extensively throughout the timeframe, they 
conclusions focused Amendment 32 and the extent to which the legislature limited the 
use of decrees and regained legislative control. Following the adoption of Amendment 
32, Congress is required to consider each provisional decree within the first 45-days after 
issuance; if Congress does not, then it is immediately placed at the top of the legislative 
docket for urgent consideration. As a result, Perira et al. found that Presidents have used 
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this ability to stall the legislative process. In 2005, their research concluded that the 
executive decrees accounted for 65% of all the Federal Senate’s legislative sessions 
(Pereira, Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential 
Decrees, and the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congress 71). 
Additionally, after Amendment 32, the conversion rate of executive decrees was in fact 
higher than post, equaling 79%. They cite these two factors as evidence that the president 
has excreted considerable influence over the legislature. 
While the work of Perira et al. lends support to the executive dominance 
interpretation of provisional decrees, their research does not take into account some 
crucial factors. They concluded that Amendment 32 further weakened Congress’s power 
through the automatic consideration provision; however, they did not consider the impact 
of Congressional approval and disapproval of decrees, and they did not consider the 
ability for legislatures and political party to support their individual legislation in their 
analysis. While it important to underscore the use of provisional decrees, there are many 
more factors that define Brazil’s lawmaking process. In contrast to the work of Perira et 
al., the work of Reich supports an alternative interpretation of Amendment 32 and 
provisional decrees.  
Rather than representing erosion of power, Reich found that provisional decrees 
in Brazil are more strongly identified as a rational delegation decision to outsource 
certain lawmaking to the executive (14). To support this conclusion, Reich considered 
how the countries diverse and unique party system impacts lawmaking. From an 
American perspective, it is quite perplexing why a legislature would provide a president 
with such considerable power; however, Reich makes an important distinction in this 
33 
assumption. Political turnover in the legislature is much higher in Brazil’s Congress than 
in the United States; Reich compared the 10% turnover in the U.S. House of 
Representatives to that of Brazilian Chamber of Deputies average of 50% (Reich 14). 
Additionally, Reich supported his argument that Congress is voluntarily willing to 
succeed power to the President because the executive branch possesses far more 
institutional knowledge and experience at creating and administering laws. He supported 
this contention by examining the committee structure within Congress, which has 
historically been weak and disorganized.  
In the United States, legislators seek to gain policy experience by specializing on 
a few key interests and use the committee structure to further enhance their experience; 
however in Brazil, this is not the case. In Brazil, legislators are unable to gain significant 
policy experience because of the legislature’s framework. Institutional rules of both the 
Chambers of Deputies and Federal Senate mandate that the executive leadership of 
committees change every two years, and that legislators cannot be reelected to serve 
consecutive terms within the same committee; as a result, this has led to a lack of policy 
experience and development (Reich 15). Thus, Reich interpreted the use of provisional 
decree data to represent an expressed will of the Brazilian Congress to enable the bettered 
prepared and experienced executive with responsibility of drafting some laws. 
Additionally, Reich also disputed Perira et al.’s contention that instead of limiting 
provisional decrees, Amendment 32 increased the number of decrees that were converted 
into law. While the conversion rate was higher in the post-Amendment 32 period, Reich 
argued that legislative oversight was not diminished because of legislative amendments. 
Reich found that 65.4% of all converted decrees during this period contained 
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amendments that either reformed the use of the decree and added pork and other 
earmarks for social policy (17). Reich ultimately concludes that amendments to 
provisional decrees, prior to conversion, represents legislative oversight and weakening 
Perira et al.’s argument (22).  
Relevancy of Literature 
 The review of literature concerning the presidential and parliamentary systems, 
the constitutional organization of Brazil’s federal government, its party system and 
structure, and the competing theories on provisional decree usage draws an interesting 
illustration about the nature of Brazil’s legislative process. Initially modeled highly after 
the United States’ system of government, Brazil represents an interesting case to study 
the effects one presidential power has on the lawmaking process and on the country’s 
separation of power.  
With numerous political parties vying for leadership, the weak and undisciplined 
nature of some political parties, the lack of any institutional knowledge and experience 
due to the committee structure, the literature review tends to support Reich’s conclusion 
concerning provisional decree usage. Realizing that institutionally Congress does not 
have the experience or means to enact substantial policy or legislation, Congress 
voluntarily and willfully allows the president to create policy through provisional decree; 
and once it has been enacted, Congress is able to exercise its oversight prerogatives by 
either rejecting the decree from consideration or by adopting the text of the provisional 
decree with various amendments individual legislators might offer.  
If Reich’s conclusions are true, it would be expected that after the adoption of 
Amendment 32, which reformed the use of provisional decrees, that a much larger 
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portion of provisional decrees would be either rejected or amended before converted into 
law; this would be expected because the executive would no longer be able to indefinitely 
issue their provisional decrees. Additionally if Reich’s interpretation is accurate, there 
would be no substantial increase in the amount of original decrees issued either before or 
after Amendment 32. Amendment 32, while restricting the reissuing of decrees, did not 
impact Congress’s ability to provide oversight to provisional decrees; as a result, 
Amendment 32 would have no impact on the continued use of decrees by Presidents or 
the number of decrees issued per year. While the literature tends to support Reich’s 
contention that the usage of provisional decrees and the subsequent conversion of those 
decree in law is a rational choice and decision of Congress, the literature also supports the 
competing interpretation that decrees represent an erosion of separation of powers and 
Congress’s legislative prerogatives.   
Pereira, Power, and Renno’s research supports the notion that provisional decree 
usage has allowed the executive to effectively dominate the legislative process in Brazil. 
Pereira et al. hold that, due to the various dynamics in the relationship between the two 
organizations and the factors that influence the legislative process, the use of the 
provisional decrees have become a regular ability that presidents exercise to enact their 
legislative agendas. If their findings are valid, it would be expected that the number of 
provisional decrees issued would continue to increase per year, and that Amendment 32 
would not have an impact on usage of decrees. Furthermore, Pereira et al. believe that 
Amendment 32 further weakened Congress’ ability to provide oversight of provisional 
decrees by mandating that both chamber address each and every provisional decree. If 
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this contention holds true, I would expect that the number of provisional decrees rejected 
or nullified by Congress to be lower than prior to the adoption of the amendment.  
While the two competing interpretations of provisional decree usage provide 
compelling arguments and inferences for Brazil’s legislative process, Reich and Pereira et 
al.’s work does not resolve all of the questions regarding decrees. Pereira et al.’s 
contention that Amendment 32 weakens Congressional oversight does not address, and is 
in fact at odds with, Reich’s findings. Additionally, Reich’s work does not address 
Pereira et al. opinion that provisional decrees have represented a large component of all 
new laws created in Brazil. 
My research seeks to provide an understanding of the two prevailing theories on 
provisional decrees and their conclusions. In the following chapter, I describe how I use 
descriptive process tracing to test two hypotheses linked to Pereira et al. and Reich’s 
findings. First, I hypothesize that if Pereira et al.’s beliefs are true, Brazilian presidents 
have routinize provisional decree usage. I expect that if it has in fact become routinized, 
then the number of provisional decrees issued should increase in each subsequent year. If 
it has not, then I expect the number of decrees issued will fluctuate from each year and 
with each president. My second hypothesis focuses on Congressional approval of 
provisional decrees and Reich’s work. I hypothesize that after the adoption of 
Amendment 32, Congress was able to provide more oversight over provisional decrees 
and was able to regain some control over the legislative process. To measure 
Congressional oversight, I examine the number of provisional decrees that were rejected, 
impaired, and found ineffective by Congress. Additionally, I examined Congress’s role in 
the legislative process by measuring how many ordinary pieces of legislation Congress 
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passed both before and after Amendment 32. If Pereira et al.’s conclusions are true, I 
expect the total provisional decrees converted to be higher after Amendment 32 and that 





 As demonstrated in the previous two chapters, the use of provisional decrees by 
Brazilian Presidents has been widely discussed and studied, both from Brazilian 
legislators and by international and comparative political scientists. Commonly 
representing a trend towards the executive dominance of the legislative process, this 
study focused on articulating how the use of provisional decree has impacted the 
legislative process in Brazil. In a presidential system, there is a competing struggle for 
power between that of a president, who must represent the interests of country as a 
whole, and that of the legislative body, whose members represents the divergent and 
diverse interests of the various constituencies. Although there are traditional influences of 
elections, political parties, and political interests common to all systems, there are 
numerous factors that can shape and alter the relationship between the executive and the 
legislative powers in Brazil; and this study sought to address how both the president and 
the Congress have reacted to these influences. 
 This study focused on assessing the legislative success of Brazil’s presidents by 
examining the issuance of provisional decrees and how these were converted into law, 
and Congress’s ability to provide effective oversight over these provisional decrees by 
examining how many decrees were either supported or rejected by Congress. To 
accomplish this, the study compared two central components: first, how many provisional 
decrees were issued, how many were subsequently reissued, and how many provisional 
decrees were successfully converted into law.  Secondly, this study examined Congress’s 
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legislative oversight capabilities by measuring how many provisional decrees were either 
approved or otherwise rejected by the legislature. Additionally, this research sought to 
understand Brazil’s legislative process by examining the total number of ordinary 
legislation passed through Congress and comparing this data to provisional decrees.  
Provisional decree powers were formally introduced in Brazil’s 1988 Constitution; 
however, this study sought to measure the impact Amendment 32 had on the issuance of 
decrees and on the executive-legislative and lawmaking relationship. Adopted in 2001, 
this study tracked the provisional decrees and traditional laws passed over a ten-year 
period, beginning with the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1997 to 2003 
and ending with presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2003-2010. Using these 
data, the research concentrated on two hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESES 
H1: Conceptualized as an emergency power, Brazilian presidents have routinized the use 
of provisional decrees by regularly issuing provisional decrees.  
 
H2: Introduced to further clarify and refine the use of provisional decrees, the adoption of 
Constitutional Amendment 32 empowered Congress to exercise its oversight 
prerogatives, as measured by the number of provisional decrees rejected by the 
legislature.  
DESCRIPTIVE PROCESS TRACING 
 Qualitative in nature, descriptive process tracing was selected for the method of 
this study. Within the study of political science research, the use, expansion, and 
definition of process tracing has progressed over the past decade. Described as a 
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“fundamental tool of qualitative research”, it enables a research to answer questions 
through “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of 
research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 823). Process 
tracing allows for researchers to form inferences and conclusions from data that is often 
too difficult or ambiguous (Collier 1). While process tracing is a typical method of 
political science research, there has been a lack of a centralized standard for the method; 
and this has led to various misperceptions about the central tenants of process tracing 
(Barnes and Weller 3); however for the purpose of this study, descriptive process tracing 
was used.  
 Descriptive process tracing enables a research to “make decisive contributions to 
diverse research objectives, including identifying novel political and social phenomena 
and systematically describing them, evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering 
new hypotheses, and assessing these new casual claims, and gaining insight into casual 
mechanisms” (Collier 824). Central to this study was examining how the dynamics of the 
executive-legislative relationship has changed, and thus process tracing provides a 
capable method of explaining the gradual dynamics in the relationship. Additionally, 
descriptive process tracing enables a research to overcome a major hurdle of quantitative 
research: casual analysis.  
When using process tracing, investigators are often presented with numerous 
variables and “infinite number of intervening casual steps between any independent and 
dependent variables” (Mahoney 125). Indeed, as this study has focused on examining the 
legislative success of two parties, there are numerous variables that can overwhelm the 
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researcher; however descriptive-process tracing is able to overcome this fault through 
focusing on one core aspect: time.  
“As a tool of causal inference, process tracing focuses on the unfolding of events 
or situations over time” (Collier 824), process tracing represents an ideal method for 
analyzing data concerning the number of bills passed each year. It is able to accomplish 
this analysis through the discovery of casual-process observations, or CPOs, are “insights 
or pieces of data that provide information about context, process, or mechanism, and that 
contribute distinct leverage in casual inferences” (Brady, Collier and Seawright 277). 
While process tracing examines history, how events have evolved over time, it can 
provide more detailed analysis and inferences, “A process-tracing explanation differs 
from a historical narrative, as it requires converting a purely historical account that 
implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical 
variables that have been identified in the research design” (Bennett and George 3).  
 
MEASURES 
 This study analyzed data derived from the official website of the Brazilian Federal 
Government, Planlto.gov.br. A government archive, the website contains an expansive 
record database of official government documents, from the Constitution, to common and 
supplemental laws, and all executive decrees issued since the establishment of the 1988 
Constitution. Using Google Translate and translation from a Portuguese speaker, this 
study examined two aspects of law: provisional decrees and common laws. These two 
aspects were of the law were measured using the following descriptions. 
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Provisional Decrees Issued 
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees issued per year by presidents.  
Provisional Decrees Converted 
This measure tracks the number of provisional decrees that were successfully adopted by 
the Brazilian National Congress, and subsequently was converted into I’m permanent 
laws.      
Provisional Decrees Reissued 
This measure tracks the number of provisional decrees that were subsequently reissued 
by a president after failing to be converted into law. Prior to Amendment 32, presidents 
were allowed to indefinitely reissue decrees. Following Amendment 32, presidents are 
only allowed to reissue the decree once, within the same session of the legislature.  
Provisional Decrees Rejected 
This measure tracks the number of provisional decrees that were not converted into law 
by Congress, and were subsequently declared null and void.  
Provisional Decrees Impaired 
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees which legal status were 
compromised through legislative action. For instance, a provisional decree can be 
impaired when a legislative act alters the specific body of law the decree addressed.  
Provisional Decrees Ineffective 
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees that were not converted, 




Common Laws Passed 
This measure refers to the number of laws that were passed through the traditional 
legislative process and that were subsequently signed into law by Brazilian presidents.  
Common Laws Vetoed 
This measure refers to the number of laws, passed through the traditional legislative 
process, that were vetoed by Brazilian presidents.  
 
ANALYSIS PLAN 
 The following chapter contains the results of the research conducted for this 
study. Examining legislative data over the period of ten years, the results have been 
summarized by examining the total number of provisional decrees issued, reissued, and 
converted. The results are separated by time: the first measuring the total scope of the 
study, from 1997-2007; the second measuring the total from the beginning of the study to 
the adoption of Amendment 32, from 1997-2001; and finally, the totals following the 
adoption of Amendment 32, from 2001-2007. Additionally, the totals of common laws 
passed and vetoed were separated using the same convention. Next, conclusions about 
how the executive-legislative relationship evolved as a result of provisional decrees and 
Amendment 32 were reached after both hypotheses were analyzed. Finally, I address the 
impact of legislative support Presidents Cardoso and Lula possessed during their 




While presidential systems are defined by the separation of administrative, 
legislative, and judicial powers, most systems empower their executives with abilities to 
help shape the legislative process. In order to avoid a presidential veto, it is generally 
expected that legislatures will work with presidents to ensure that legislation is reflective 
of their administrative and legislative priorities. Although this provides presidents with 
the unique ability to shape and influence the legislative process, it is the ultimate 
responsibility of the legislature to pass, amend, and repeal laws.  
 In Brazil, it is clear that the use of provisional decrees has affected the method 
through which presidents influence the legislative process. After analyzing the data 
compiled from the official website of the Brazilian Federal Government, Planalto, I 
reached the conclusion that presidents have routinized their use of provisional decrees; in 
effect, it has allowed Presidents Cardoso and Lula to circumvent the prerogatives and 
responsibilities of Congress to initiate the legislative process.  
 Issuing a total of 1,116 provisional decrees from 1997 to 2007, Brazilian 
Presidents Cardoso and Lula effectively created over 33% of all new laws, independent 
from the traditional legislative process. Found in table 4.1, this data suggests that 
Presidents Lula and Cardoso held considerable power over the legislative and policy 
agenda of the Brazilian Congress.   
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Table 4.1: Provisional Decree and Common Laws Totals from 1997 to 2007    
Under President Cardoso, his 806 provisional decrees accounted for 40% of all 
new laws adopted from 1997-2002. During this same time period, the Congress passed 
1,209 common laws under the traditional legislative process, as demonstrated in table 4.2. 
While the number of laws during this time period was predominantly laws passed by the 
legislature, it is still important to underscore that President Cardoso was still able to have 
his legislative initiatives enacted through provisional decrees. In a presidential system, it 
is expected that an executive have some influence over the legislative process; however, 
it is not expected that this influence would comprise 40% of all new laws passed.    
Table 4.2: Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals under President Cardoso (1997-2002) 
While the total number of provisional decrees issued under (420) President Lula 
was much smaller because of the reforms set into effect by Amendment 32, the 
conclusions and data remained largely the same. Although Lula’s provisional decrees 
accounted for 19% of all new laws passed during his presidency, his provisional decrees 
were nonetheless converted into law at a high rate, approximately 87%. This data is 
Provisional Decree and Common Laws Totals from 1997 to 2007    
Decrees (Issued + Reissued) 1,116 
Bills Passed 2,242 
Total 3,358 
Percentage Decrees (((Decrees Issued + Reissued)/Total))*100) 33% 
Percentage Bills (Bills Passed/Total) 67% 
Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals Under President Cardoso (1997-2002) 
Provisional Decrees Issued 353 
Decrees Re-Issued 453 
Decrees Converted 257 
Total Decrees Issued 806 
Percentage of Decrees Converted ((Converted/ Total Issued)*100) 32% 
    
Common Laws Passed 1,209 
Total Laws Passed (Total Decrees Issued + Common Laws Passed) 2,015 
Percentage of Law as Decree ((Total Decrees/Total Laws Passed)*100) 40% 
Percentage of Law as Common Laws ((Total Common Laws/Total Laws Passed)*100) 60% 
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found in table 4.3. Designed as an emergency power, Presidents Cardoso and Lula 
historically used provisional decrees to impact the policy agenda and to control the 
national legislative process; and thus, this data supports hypothesis 1.  
 
It is important to underscore the importance behind the total number of provisional 
decrees issued and the subsequent number of those degrees converted into law.  For the 
time frame measured, Presidents Cardoso and Lula effectively issued a total of 1,116 
provisional decrees, brining into existence new federal departments, established new 
regulatory measures, and directed federal funds without the oversight and duties of the 
Congress, as demonstrated in chart 4.1.  
Constitutionally, these decrees are provisional and subject to legislative approval; 
however in practice, very few were challenged by the legislature. Under Cardoso, 
Congress rejected only 1 of his decrees and converted nearly 60%, or 257 of his decrees; 
and because Amendment 32 was not yet adopted, Cardoso was able to reissue his decrees 
without limit for the majority of his presidency. Of his 251 decrees prior to the adoption 
of amendment 32, he reissued those decrees over 453 times. Under Lula, where 
Table 4.3 Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals under President Lula (2003-2010) 
 
Provisional Decree and Common Law Totals under President Lula (2003-2010)   
Provisional Decrees Issued 420 
Decrees Re-Issued 0 
Decrees Converted 366 
Total Decrees Issued 420 
Percentage of Decrees Converted ((Converted/ Total Issued)*100) 87% 
    
Common Laws Passed 1773 
Total Laws Passed (Total Decrees Issued + Common Laws Passed) 2193 
Percentage of Law as Decree ((Total Decrees/Total Laws Passed)*100) 19% 
Percentage of Law as Common Laws ((Total Common Laws/Total Laws Passed)*100) 80% 
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Amendment 32 restrained him, Congress rejected a total 10%, or 43, of his 420 
provisional decrees. Additionally, Congress converted 87% of his decrees, a total of 362. 
Given the data, it becomes clear that Congress adopted Amendment 32 in an attempt to 
curtail the use of provisional decrees; however, the effect was not as strong as the intent 
of the amendment.  
  
After adopting Amendment 32, the Brazilian National Congress was able to regain some 
power and oversight over the executive by limiting the ability to reissue provisional 
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Chart 4.1: Provisional Decree Issuance and Conversion from 1997-2007 
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and Amendment 32, the number of reissued decrees dropped to zero, according to the 
data, as represented in table 4.3.  
 
Unable to permanently legislate through decree, Presidents Cardoso and Lula 
were forced to seek Congressional approval of their decrees. Moreover from 2002-2007, 
Congress exercised its ability to invalidate and rejected decrees far more often. Under 
Lula, a total of 42 decrees were either rejected by a vote of Congress, were overturned via 
a new law passed by Congress, or impaired by Congress; conversely under Cardoso, only 
one of his decrees was rejected. After the adoption of Amendment 32, moreover, 
Congress was able to enact more laws through the traditional legislative process than 
before. Under Lula, 1,773 ordinary laws were passed by Congress and signed into law by 
the President, with only 154 being subjected to veto. Under Cardoso, this number was 





























































Table 4.3: Provisional Decrees Reissued from 1997-2010 
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fell after Amendment 32. Prior to Amendment 32, Cardoso issued 806 provisional 
decrees; Lula issued 420 decrees, a 52% net decline. While this data supports the 
contention that Congress was able to curtail the use of provisional decrees and regain its 
oversight responsibilities, it does not fully support the notion that Amendment 32 
fundamentally altered the existing executive-legislative relationship. If the relationship 
changed, the data would be reflective of more Congressional oversight, as measured by 
the increase in provisional decrees found ineffective, impaired, or rejected; however, it 
does not, as observed in chart 4.3.  
 
 
After adopting Amendment 32, the percentage of decrees that were converted into 


























Unconstutional Decrees Imparied Decrees Ineffective
Decrees Rejected Decrees Repealed Decrees Revoked
Provisional Decrees Issued
Chart 4.3: Congressional Oversight of Provisional Decrees 
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Cardoso’s. Although Congress rejected a higher percentage of decrees following 
Amendment 32, it nonetheless ratified a large percentage of Lula’s decrees. While 
suggests that by-and-large, Congress supported the Presidents Cardoso and Lula’s 
agendas, the two Presidents exercised their veto authority more dynamically. Under 
Cardoso, he vetoed 83, or 8.5%, of the total 971 bills presented to him; whereas Congress 
rejected 1, or less than .01% of his decrees. Lula, moreover, vetoed a higher percentage 
of the 1,271 bills presented to him, 13%, or 154 total vetoes. Comparing the data, Lula 
rejected a higher percentage of bills passed through Congress than the percentage of 
provisional decrees congress rejected: 13% of laws were vetoed compared to 10% of 
decrees that were rejected. Taken as a whole, the data confirms the initial aspect of 
hypothesis 2, where Congress attempted to limit the use of provisional decree usage; 
however, it does not support the contention that Amendment 32 dynamically shifted the 
executive-legislative relationship towards more legislative oversight. If there were more 
oversight, there would have been an increase in the total number decrees rejected, 
impaired, repealed, ineffective, and revoked. While Amendment 32 impacted Presidents 
Cardoso and Lula’s ability to issue provisional decrees, it is also important to address 
each president’s respective legislative support in Congress and its impact on provisional 
decrees.   
Presidential Support in the Brazilian National Congress 
In any presidential democracy, the level of institutional support a president has in 
the legislature is a strong potential influence on the relationship between the two 
branches, and is an indicator of how an executive’s legislative agenda will be acted upon. 
In the United States and other presidential democracies, legislative support is relatively 
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easy to quantify as the number of political parties is quite often few. This does not hold 
true for Brazil.  
Elected through an open-list proportional representation system, the number of 
parties and legislators represented in the Brazilian National Congress’s changes 
frequently with each individual election for the 81 seats for the Federal Senate and 513 in 
the Chamber of Deputies. Additionally, there are over 28 registered political parties that 
all compete for seats in Congress; as of the 2010 legislative elections, 22 parties have 
members represented in either chamber of Congress (Political Database of the Americas). 
Due to the various influences discussed in chapter 2, such as the weak and poorly 
disciplined parties, the frequent trend of legislators switching political parties, and 
Samuel’s gubernatorial coattails effect, Brazilian presidents often struggle to rally 
legislative support in Congress. Specifically for provisional decrees, the level of 
legislative support a president possesses could be a relevant factor and influence in either 
the issuance of certain provisional decrees or a president’s decision to use decrees in 
general. Additionally, the level of support provides insights into the motivations behind 
political decree conversion or rejection by the legislature. Thus, it is important to measure 
this factor during the timeframe to see what effect—if any—it had on the issuance of 
provisional decrees. To measure legislative support, the preferable way is to identify the 
number of legislators that are affiliated with the president’s party. Using data obtained 
from Georgetown University’s Political Database of the Americas, I analyzed election 
data in the Chamber of Deputies from the 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 legislative 
elections in order to see how much party support Presidents Cardoso and Lula possessed 
during their administrations; the data were compiled into charts 4.4 and 4.5 below. I was 
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unable to find accurate data concerning the party composition of the Federal Senate; 
however, I believe that the Chamber of Deputies can serve as a barometer of Presidents 
Cardoso and Lula’s each respective legislative support.  
During President Cardoso’s two terms as President, his party, the PSDB, never 
possessed a plurality of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, as demonstrated in figure 
4.2. Of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, his party held approximately 13% and 
19% of the 513 seats, from 1995-1999 and 1999-2003 respectfully. Overall, there were 
over 20 parties that were competitive in the lower house during the Cardoso 
administration, and could serve as a factor that would motivate the president to use 
provisional decrees. While the PSDB never possessed a plurality of the seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies, President Cardoso was still able to create a relatively large 
governing coalition, comprised of the PSDB, the PFL, the PMDB, the PP, PPS, and PTD 
parties; his coalition possessed 381, or 74%, of the total 594 seats combined in both 
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Chart 4.4: Composition of the Chamber of Deputies during President Cardoso’s Administration from 1995-2003 
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plurality of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, President Lula and the PT party 
followed in a similar trend.  
Throughout his administration, President Lula was forced to create governing 
coalitions in order to effectively administer the government, although it proved to be 
more challenging than during the Cardoso administration. During his first term as 
President, Lula’s PT party possessed 91, or 17%, of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
the largest out of any party, as demonstrated in table 4.3. However due to the large 
membership of the Chamber and the number of parties represented within it, Lula needed 
additional support. Plagued with scandals and internal conflict within the PT concerning 
Lula’s agenda, Lula struggled to maintain a minority coalition during his first two years 
as president (Raile, Pereira and Power 5). However, Lula adapted to his mistakes and 
managed to establish a working governing coalition between the PT, PMDB, PPS, PTB, 
PcdoB, the PL, PSB, PV, and independent legislators to control 318 seats and 62% of the 
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Chart 4.4: Composition of the Chamber of Deputies during President Lula’s Administration from 2003-2010 
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Within the study of provisional decree issuance and usage in Brazil, it appears 
that the relative strength of the president’s party does not have a substantial impact on a 
president’s decision to exercise his decree authority. Comparing the party representation 
of the PSDB and PT in the Congress with the number of decrees issued, rejected, and 
converted into law, no relevant inferences or conclusions can be reached. During the 
Cardoso and Lula administrations, both of their parties’ representation in the Chamber of 
Deputies varied throughout. Yet, this does not provide any insights into why both 
increasingly used provisional decrees or why Congress continued to support and/or reject 
their decrees. If the party composition in the Chamber of Deputies was not correlated to 
my data, the relative strength of their governing coalitions did not also provide any 
additional insights. 
 From the data compiled by Raile, Pereira, and Power concerning governing 
coalitions, I also found that the strength of Cardoso’s and Lula’s coalitions did not impact 
the use, conversion, or rejection of provisional decrees. During Cardoso’s administration, 
his coalition effectively controlled 74% of the seats in Congress; and yet, the number 
decrees converted during his administration was actually lower than Lula’s, whose 
coalition was neither as large nor cohesive. Of Cardoso’s 353 provisional decrees, the 
Congress converted 73% of his total decrees; conversely under Lula, Congress converted 
87% of his 420 decrees into law. I acquired this data by measuring the number of 










Percentage Converted ((Converted/Issued)*100) 73% 
Table 4.4: Provisional Decrees Issued, Reissued, Converted, and Rejected Under President Cardoso 





Percentage Converted ((Converted/Issued)*100)) 87% 
Table 4.5: Provisional Decrees Issued, Reissued, Converted, and Rejected Under President Lula 
Summary of Findings 
 After evaluating my research as a whole, my findings support three broad 
conclusions. First, provisional decrees have become fairly routinized in Brazil, and that 
Presidents Cardoso and Lula utilized them regularly. Throughout the ten years that I 
analyzed, Cardoso and Lula issued a total of 1,116 provisional decrees that possessed the 
full force and effect of the law. Originally created as a measure to address important and 
urgent cases, provisional decrees have become a regular tool for Brazilian presidents to 
influence and control the legislative process. As a reaction to this regular use of 
provisional decrees, the Brazilian National Congress adopted Amendment 32 in an effort 
to curtail the executive’s reliance on these measures. 
  Second, although the adoption of Amendment 32 has had an impact on the usage 
of provisional decrees by executives, it has not completely restrained Brazilian 
presidents. While Amendment 32 effectively restricted presidents from reissuing their 
decrees indefinitely, it did not impact Presidents Cardoso or Lula’s decision to usage 
decrees. Following the adoption of Amendment 32, the data reflects an actual increase in 
56 
the total number of provisional decrees that were issued over the course of the five years I 
measured. Under President Cardoso, he issued a total of 354 original provisional decrees; 
where as President Lula issued 420. Additionally, percentage of provisional decrees that 
were converted into law subsequently rose as well, 87% under Lula and 73 for Cardoso. 
The research and data supports the conclusion that Amendment 32 itself was clearly 
correlated with the rise in provisional decrees and the conversion rate, and that it was not 
clearly influenced by other factors.  
Finally, the research found that other sources of influence, such as the number of 
seats controlled in the Chamber of Deputies by the president’s party or the size of the 
president’s governing collation, were not clearly associated with the variation over time 
in the number of decrees that were issued and subsequently converted into law. During 
the two terms of both Cardoso and Lula, each president’s party held a large percentage of 
the seats in the lower chamber of Congress and their governing coalitions were 
comprised of more than 60% of the total Brazilian National Congress. It can be expected 
that the more institutional and legislative support a president had, it would be more likely 
that Congress would support the executive’s legislative agenda and provisional decrees. 
However, this did not hold true. During Cardoso’s administration, his party possessed 
20% and 31% of the Chamber of Deputies and his governing coalition accounted for 74% 
of the legislature. Yet for all his support, Congress supported Lula’s provisional decrees 
to a much larger extent than Cardoso’s. If party composition or the size of the president’s 
governing coalition were correlated to provisional decree usage and conversion, President 
Cardoso would have been more successful than President Lula.  
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In the final chapter, I will discuss the general implications of my findings, how 
my research is relevant to the established literature on provisional decrees, and finally 




 The literature on provisional decrees has generally supported two disparate 
conclusions. Within this discussion, the research of Pereira, Power, and Renno support 
the conclusion that provisional decrees represent a strong executive that has able to exert 
and draw considerable power from the legislature. Conversely, Reich found that 
provisional decrees do not necessarily represent a diminishment of legislative power, as 
decrees are a rational expression of Brazil’s National Congress; additionally, he holds 
that Congress is able to exercise considerable oversight via adopting amendments to 
provisional decrees prior to conversion. Conclusively, my research and data generally 
supported both interpretation concerning provisional decrees.  
My research supported Perira et al.’s conclusions that Amendment 32 has 
provided the President with more power to control the legislative agenda. They 
concluded that the objective of Amendment 32 was to constrain the effectiveness of the 
provisional decrees; and by mandating that the legislature must consider these decrees, it 
would empower Congress with more independent oversight of the executive (Pereira, 
Power and Rennó, From Logrolling to Logjam: Agenda Power, Presidential Decrees, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Reform in the Brazilian Congress 17). Rather than 
providing more oversight, they found that it actually limited and constrained the 
legislature’s own power and legislative agenda (19). While my findings support their data 
demonstrating that the use of provisional decrees and their subsequent conversion to law 
increased following Amendment 32, my data and interpretation is not consistent with 
their overall conclusions. Perira et al. argued that Congress has “reduced its own 
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bargaining power and ceded further control to the executive” (19); however, they did not 
examine Congress’s successful rejection of decrees and passage of their institution’s own 
legislative outcomes. Following Amendment 32, Congress in fact exercised their 
oversight prerogatives much more extensively than in prior to the adoption. Before 
Amendment 32, Congress rejected 1 of President Cardoso’s provisional decree from 
1995-2001; however after 2001, Congress rejected or impaired a total of 378 provisional 
decrees. Additionally, Perira et al. did not consider the ability of Congress to use its own 
lawmaking prerogatives and ratify laws through the institution itself.  
In the five years after Amendment 32 was adopted, Congress was able to pass a 
significantly larger number of bills under the traditional legislative process than during 
the first five years of this study. From 2002-2007, Congress legislated a total 1,271 laws, 
with 154 being subjected to presidential veto. From 1995-2001, Congress passed 971 
news laws, with 83 being subjected to a veto. Institutionally, this data does not support 
Perira et al.’s conclusion that Congress succeeded power to the executive. If this were 
true, I would expect that Congress would have produced fewer bills and a subsequently 
lower number of vetoes; however, this was not supported. While my findings supported 
some of Pereira, Power, and Renno’s conclusions, my findings equally provided support 
to the Reich’s interpretation of provisional decrees usage as a rational expression of the 
legislature.  
In contrast to Perira et al.’s finding, Renno contends that due to the unusual 
institutional and constitutional arraignments, he research suggested that Congress 
delegates some lawmaking authority to the executive. The primary reason being that due 
to high turnover and a weakened committee structure, Congress lacks members that 
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possess sufficient experience to author and introduce substantial legislation; thus, the 
institution allows the executive to exercise provisional decrees, with Congress having 
final oversight over the passage or rejection of the bill. While Renno observed the 
number of provisional decrees converted into law with amendments attached, my 
research nonetheless support his conclusion that Congress still possess substantial 
oversight authority over the executive. Returning to the data concerning provisional 
decrees rejected and impaired, there is a strong increase of the number of times Congress 
rejected a decree, from 1 to 378. If Congress’s oversight power was diminished, we 
would expect that the number of rejections to be low or nonexistent; conversely, my 
research did not support this.  
Moreover, my research neither supported nor weakened Renno’s contention 
concerning the adoption of amendments to provisional decrees. From a legislative 
oversight perspective, Renno’s data does not support Perira et al.’s conclusion that 
provisional decree conversion was actually higher following Amendment 32. My data 
supported Perira et al.’s conclusion, with nearly 88% of provisional decrees being 
converted to law. However, I could not analyze whether or not the various decrees 
possessed any amendments. 
Limitations of Research and Suggestions for Further Research 
To summarize, this study sought to add to the research and discussion of how 
Brazil’s executive-legislative relationship has changed as a result of provisional decrees 
and Amendment 32. I would have liked to observe Samuel’s “gubernatorial coattails 
effect’s” impact on the dynamics in the legislature. If more Senators and Congressmen 
rallied behind gubernatorial candidates, I would then expect this to further constrain a 
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president’s legislative support and would expect to see a rise of provisional decrees. 
Additionally, it would have been ideal to follow specific provisional decrees and analyze 
them from a media and public opinion background. I believe that if the media and the 
electorate’s opinion towards a specific decree was favorable, it would influence a 
president’s position and help enhance the probability that the decrees would have passed. 
However due to my limited understanding of Portuguese and limited resources, I was not 
able to conduct this research. Ideally, I would have liked to track the process through 
which Presidents Cardoso and Lula enacted their primer and more prominent pieces of 
their legislative agenda. An analysis of how the two branches interacted would have 
provided additional insights into their relationship. Lastly, I would have preferred to 
analyze the individual text and scope of each individual decree, and measure the 
importance of each. I would expect that more ceremonial decrees would have a higher 
conversion rate; likewise, it would also be expected that decrees of a more substantial and 
controversial nature to have a much lower conversion rate.      
Taken together, I believe that an examination of the effects of the legislative 
support presidents had in Congress, Samuel’s “gubernatorial coattails effect”, and the 
media’s and public’s reaction to provisional decrees would provide a more accurate 
representation of the evolution of executive power and the effects of provisional decrees. 
By studying these facets more clearly and in greater detail, I believe that it would add 
more to the body of knowledge concerning provisional decrees.  
Conclusion 
Brazil proved to be an excellent case study to study not only the effects of 
provisional decrees, but also how the executive-legislative relationship can vary across 
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different systems. Dynamic, fluid, and ever changing, the executive-legislative 
relationship of Brazil’s federal government has in fact been influenced by provisional 
decrees; however, the effects of which are certainly not clearly defined. Traditionally, the 
rationale behind provisional decrees observes their usage as a gradual erosion of 
legislative power and oversight over the executive. While this research supports the 
conclusion that provisional decree usage has increased, the extent to which the 
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Appendix 1: Additional Provisional Decree Measures 
Provisional Decrees Revoked 
This measure refers to the number of provisional decrees that were withdrawn by 
presidents.  
Provisional Decrees Found Unconstitutional  
This measure refers to the amount of provisional decrees whose effectiveness was found 
unconstitutional through the judicial review power of the Brazilian judicial system.  
67 
Appendix 2: Provisional Decree Data 
  Year             
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (Pre Amend. 32) 2001 (Post Amend. 32) 2002 
Provisional Decrees 
Issued 34 47 38 23 109 20 82 
Decrees Converted 32 43 36 16 45 18 67 
Decrees Reissued 59 93 111 57 133 0 0 
Decrees Revoked 2 1 1 7 1 0 0 
Total Decrees Issued 93 140 149 80 242 20 82 
Decrees Repealed 0 0 0 0 11 0 0 
Decrees Rejected 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 
Decrees Ineffective 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Decrees Impaired 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decrees Unconstitutional 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 Year 
         2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Provisional Decrees 
Issued 58 73 42 67 70 41 27 42 
Decrees Converted 57 66 34 60 60 35 24 30 
Decrees Reissued 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Decrees Revoked 1 4 1 0 0 0 0   
Total Decrees Issued 58 73 42 67 70 41 27 42 
Decrees Repealed 0 0   0 3 1 0 0 
Decrees Rejected 0 0 3 3 4 3 0 1 
Decrees Ineffective 0 3 2 4 1 1 3 10 
Decrees Impaired 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 
Decrees Unconstitutional 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Note: Red shading denotes the Cardoso administration and green denotes Lula’s presidency.  
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Appendix 3: Ordinary Legislation Data 
  Years                           
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Ordinary Laws Passed 169 178 175 219 230 238 201 271 184 179 198 259 290 191 
Veto 2 4 15 31 31 24 30 26 25 22 27 35 46 27 
Note: Red shading denotes the Cardoso administration and green denotes Lula’s presidency.  
 
